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Non-technical Summary 
 
German savings banks are closely linked with their relevant local authority due to their 
public ownership. Similar to joint-stock companies, which may distribute profits to 
their stockholders, savings banks are allowed to distribute profits to their local 
authorities. The savings banks’ payout decision, however, is strongly regulated by law. 
By this means it should be granted that savings banks accumulate enough money to 
expand their business and can fulfil regulatory capital requirements even in future 
years. Each federal state within Germany sets its own rules regarding the maximum 
amount of money that may be distributed. These rules depend on some financial ratios 
measuring the savings banks’ capitalisation. Within these legal limits the savings 
banks should determine a “reasonable” payout ratio. 
We find that profitability and portfolio risk as well as size are the main drivers 
influencing the payout decision. The higher the profitability and size and the smaller 
portfolio risk, the more likely are the savings banks to distribute profits or to choose a 
higher payout ratio. 
Savings banks are expected to distribute profits reluctantly, since they heavily rely 
on retained profits to fund their desired business growth. Local authorities, however, 
are in need of these money transfers, since they are highly indebted and lack financial 
means. Therefore, the financial situation of the local authorities may be another 
potential determinant influencing the savings banks’ payout decision.  
Indeed, we find that the financial situation of the relevant local authority influences 
the payout ratio as well. Both the indebtedness and the personnel costs per inhabitant 
do have a significant and positive impact on the level of payouts. Although there are 
some hints that the local authorities exert some pressure on the savings banks, 
however, it could not be excluded that the savings banks voluntarily consider the 
financial situation of the local authority when determining their payout ratio. 
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1 Introduction 
The German savings banks represent a very special banking group.1 They are the only 
banking group within Europe that is still publicly owned. The reasoning behind the 
perpetuation of public ownership is the public mandate of the savings banks. They aim 
at increasing public welfare by increasing competition among banks, by granting loans 
to all private and public entities within their region, and by enhancing the economic 
structure of the region via donations. As savings banks were originally founded and 
capitalised by local authorities, therefore, they are traditionally closely linked to the 
relevant local authority. Consequently, the local authorities even today are 
predominantly provided with credits from the local savings bank. Furthermore, many 
local authorities receive distributed profits from the related savings bank like 
shareholders from joint-stock companies. In contrast to shareholders, however, local 
authorities have to utilise the money for purposes of public utility. 
The savings banks’ payout decision is strongly regulated by law. By this means it 
should be granted that savings banks accumulate enough money to expand their 
business and can fulfil regulatory capital requirements even in future years. Each 
federal state within Germany sets its own rules regarding the maximum amount of 
money that may be distributed. These rules depend on some financial ratios measuring 
the savings banks’ capitalisation. Well capitalised savings banks according to these 
ratios are not forced to payout, but are free to distribute a sum between zero and the 
maximum amount allowed by law. However, the level of payouts should be consistent 
with the individual financial situation of the savings bank.2 As a consequence, it is 
expected that internal factors like profitability or capitalisation help explain the 
savings banks’ payout decision within these legal boundaries. 
Nevertheless, there may be some conflicting interests. Savings banks are expected 
to distribute profits reluctantly, since they heavily rely on retained profits to fund their 
desired business growth. Local authorities, however, are in need of these money 
transfers, since they are highly indebted and lack financial means. Therefore, the 
financial situation of the local authorities may be another potential determinant 
influencing the savings banks’ payout decision. According to the federal laws, the 
local authorities may have some influence on the savings banks’ payout decision. The 
decision whether or to what extent the savings bank will distribute profits is usually 
made (except from the federal state of North-Rhine-Westphalia) by the board of 
directors (Verwaltungsrat). Due to the special public ownership of German savings 
banks, most members of the board of directors are elected by the relevant local 
authorities (towns and districts), whereas the other members usually are employees of 
the savings bank.3
 
1  For an overview of the characteristics of German savings banks in contrast to other 
 German banking groups, see e.g. Hackethal (2003) or Koetter et al. (2004). 
2  See e.g. §24 para. 1 savings banks’ law of Lower Saxony. 
3  See Püttner (2003) for a detailed survey of the German savings banks’ laws by the 
 federal states. 
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Therefore, it is not implausible that the interests of the local authorities could 
influence the savings banks’ payout decision.4 Sapienza (2002), for instance, found 
some evidence for a politically motivated behaviour of state-owned banks in Italy. His 
results suggest that the interest rates charged by the state-owned banks are 
significantly lower the stronger the political party in the area where the firm is 
borrowing. 
In this study we investigate the determinants of the German savings banks’ payout 
decision in more detail. Section 2 refers to the testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents 
the data used for the empirical analysis and Section 4 introduces the model to validate 
the hypotheses. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes the analysis. 
2 Hypotheses 
The laws by the various federal states are not very specific about how savings banks 
should decide on their individual payout level between zero and the legal maximum 
payout level. According to law, the payout should be “reasonable” and should reflect 
the current profitability, as well as the financial situation and the risk situation of the 
bank. Therefore, it can be assumed that more profitable and better capitalised banks 
are generally more willing to distribute profits or to increase their payouts. In fact, a 
higher profitability increases the financial scope of the savings bank, since it may have 
excess profits after retaining enough profits for future business growth. Finally, the 
high relevance of profitability would also be in line with the findings from a large 
number of papers ranging from Lintner (1956) to more recent papers e.g. by Da Silva 
et al. (2002), which examine the dividend behaviour of non-financial corporations.  
Proposition 1: The higher the profitability, the more likely the savings bank will 
distribute profits or increase their payout level.  
Furthermore, savings banks with a high capital-to-asset ratio might be less reliant 
on retained earnings in order to increase their capital ratio. Therefore, we would expect 
that better capitalised savings banks are more willing to distribute profits. However, 
besides capital, also the level of portfolio risk has to be considered, since banking 
regulation demands to keep a certain proportion of capital to risk. We expect that 
savings banks with a higher risk exposure are more reluctant to distribute profits than 
other banks, since it is more risky for them to fall below the minimum of regulatory 
capital. To obtain some evidence, whether the ratio of capital over risk-weighted assets 
has some influence on the savings banks’ payout decision, we also considered this 
combined variable in our analysis.   
Proposition 2: The higher (lower) the savings bank’s capital ratio (portfolio 
risk), the more likely the bank will distribute profits or increase their payout 
level. 
 
4  See Neuberger/Schindler (2001). 
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However, the payout decision may also be influenced by the local authorities, who 
are potentially able to achieve their own interests. According to Mauerer (1999) the 
local authorities even beset savings banks to increase payouts. Indeed, in most federal 
states, the Verwaltungsrat, which represents the link between the savings banks’ 
managers and the local authorities, decides on the distribution of profits by the savings 
banks. Two thirds of its members usually are elected by the local authorities, whereas 
only one third of them comprises employees of the savings bank. Furthermore, the 
president of the Verwaltungsrat usually is the head of the local or district authority in 
which the savings bank is headquartered. Therefore, the payout decision may even be 
driven by factors that do not refer to the situation of the individual bank, but could 
reflect the interest of the local authority. Highly indebted local authorities for example 
may be forced to receive additional financial means. Distributed profits of the savings 
banks being as high as possible thus can be desired especially by local authorities in 
financial difficulties.5 As nearly all German local authorities are severely indebted in 
the latest years, their potential efforts to increase savings banks’ payouts would be 
plausible. However, we cannot clearly differentiate, whether this potential relationship 
is driven by the local authorities or the savings banks. On the one hand, it is possible, 
that the local authorities push for high payouts, on the other hand the savings banks 
may voluntarily distribute profits if their local authority is highly indebted. However, 
since the federal laws demand that the level of payouts should depend on the internal 
financial situation of the savings bank only, the first alternative is more plausible. In 
other words, there may exist a modified clientele effect according to the previous 
understanding: Savings banks which are related to a clientele (local authority) in a 
difficult financial situation thus may be urged to distribute relatively more profits than 
other savings banks. The original clientele effect suggested by Modigliani and Miller 
(1961) and empirically confirmed by Elton and Gruber (1970) and Borges (2002)), 
however, is not applicable for savings banks, since they cannot attract a desired 
clientele by choosing a certain payout ratio. 
Proposition 3: The worse the financial situation of the local authorities, the more 
likely the savings bank will payout profits or increase the payout level. 
Finally, the amount of debt lent to the related local authority might proxy the 
strength of the relationship between the savings bank and the local authority. The 
potential impact of the savings banks’ lending on their payout behaviour, however, is 
unclear. On the one hand, the pressure to distribute (more) profits might increase with 
a stronger lending to the local authority, since the relationship between both 
institutions is closer. On the other hand, the lending to the local authorities might be 
regarded as a substitute for payouts, since the interest rates claimed from the local 
 
5  The distributions of profits are potentially only a part of the benefits granted to the local 
 authorities, as the savings banks basically are also allowed to give donations to them. 
 However, information about the donations to the local authorities do not exist and could 
 not be taken into account. In addition, they would be problematic from a legal point of 
 view, since they may erode the regulation of the distribution of profits. 
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authorities usually are favourable to them. Therefore, both a positive and negative 
impact on the payout behaviour would be plausible.  
3 Data 
In order to examine the payout behaviour of German savings banks in detail, we use 
balance sheet information and income statements provided by the private dataset 
provider Hoppenstedt. Since this dataset does only include about 70 percent of all 
German savings banks and is biased towards larger savings banks, we supplemented 
the dataset manually with the help of individual balance sheet and profit and loss 
account information which were published in the Bundesanzeiger. We merged this 
dataset with information about the financial situation of the German municipalities and 
districts, which are provided by the Federal Statistic Office. More specifically, the data 
for the German municipalities originates from the statistical yearbooks of German 
municipalities. The data had to be prepared manually, since they are not available 
electronically. The data for the German districts, however, were provided 
electronically by the Federal Statistical Office directly.  
However, some few savings banks could not be considered in the analysis, since 
their related municipalities were too small and no data was available for them. We 
started our analysis with the year 1995, since some definitions of variables regarding 
the financial situation of the districts had basically changed in 1995.6
We explicitly took account of the three different types of German savings banks. 
There are savings banks related to the local municipality (Stadtsparkasse), savings 
banks related to the district (Kreissparkasse) and finally savings banks related to an 
alliance of municipalities and districts (Zweckverbandssparkasse). Due to the 
continuing process of mergers particularly among both groups of Stadtsparkassen and 
Kreissparkassen, the number of Zweckverbandssparkassen has steadily increased in 
recent years. In the end of 2003, about every second German savings bank already 
belonged to that latter type, whereas Stadt- and Kreissparkassen each accounted for a 
quarter of all savings banks. According to these various types of savings banks, we 
consequently matched Stadtsparkassen with the financial data for the relevant 
municipality, Kreissparkassen with the data for the relevant district and 
Zweckverbandssparkassen with the data for the relevant alliance of both municipalities 
and districts. In the latter cases, we used the mean values7 of both the relevant 
municipalities and the relevant districts. 
As the payout level is concerned, German savings banks have to observe several 
restrictions set by the individual federal states. These restrictions by the federal 
 
6  The income of the districts was partly not adjusted before 1995 and therefore do not allow 
 a comparison of the data before and after 1995. Furthermore the data was incomplete for 
 several years before 1995. 
7  We also experimented with another calculation and took the data of the relevant local 
 authority only, which is in the worse financial situation, since this local authority may be 
 of especially high relevance for the payout decision of the savings bank. However, we 
 obtained very similar results. 
legislator should prevent the savings banks from paying too many profits to the 
municipality or district. Since savings banks have hardly any alternatives to finance 
their credit growth, they rely heavily on retained profits. Dependent on the federal 
state in which the savings bank is headquartered, the maximum payout ratio depends 
on different financial ratios. In the federal states of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse, 
Lower Saxony and Schleswig Holstein the financial ratio is defined as the ratio of 
reserves divided by total assets or debt. This ratio determines, whether the savings 
bank and how much it may distribute at a maximum, respectively. In other federal 
states the maximum distribution of profits is determined by risk-weighted assets and 
the level of regulatory capital. Unfortunately, these latter information are rarely made 
public. Since even any approximation proved to be too rough, we thus could not 
deduce any indication, whether and to what extent savings banks in these federal states 
are allowed to distribute profits or not.8 Due to the fact that we thus could not model 
the savings banks’ decision to distribute profits in these federal states, we focused our 
analysis on the former federal states of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse, Lower Saxony 
and Schleswig Holstein which roughly make up a third of all German savings banks. 
This restriction on four federal states, however, does not mean a severe limitation of 
the analysis. In many other federal states, no savings banks actually do distribute 
profits and thus could not be taken into account anyway. Table 1 summarises the 
specific legal minimum requirements in these federal states to distribute profits. 
 
Table 1: Legal minimum requirement to distribute profits 
 
Reserves ... of all ... .
have to be at
Federal state Time period least ... % ...
Baden-Wuerttemberg 87-90 5 debt
91-94 5 total assets
95-01 4 total assets
Hesse 87-89 3 deposits
90-01 4 total assets
Lower Saxony 87-89 3 deposits
90-01 3 debt
Schleswig-Holstein 87-01 3 total assets  
 
Since we intend to measure, which factors drive the savings banks’ decision to 
distribute profits, we restricted our sample to these banks, which are in fact allowed to 
distribute profits. That is why we disregarded those banks, which do not fulfil the legal 
minimum requirement to distribute profits. Therefore, the remaining savings banks in 
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8  The exact calculation of risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital requires information 
 that is not available in the annual accounts. Therefore, we could not clearly differentiate 
 between savings banks which fulfil the legal requirements in order to distribute profits and 
 those, which do not. 
our final sample are those which may freely decide on whether to distribute profits or 
not and if, to distribute profits on a certain level up to the regulatory maximum. Table 
2 shows the number of all savings banks in our sample, the number of savings banks 
which are allowed to distribute profits and finally these banks which actually do so. 
Since the laws in the various federal states differ considerably, we consciously 
differentiate between the four federal states in detail.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics (Number of savings banks) 
 
Year All Pot. Act. All Pot. Act. All Pot. Act. All Pot. Act. All Pot. Act.
1995 66 7 2 29 5 4 57 56 17 15 12 2 167 80 25
1996 66 7 3 29 5 4 57 56 15 15 11 2 167 79 24
1997 66 7 2 28 7 4 55 55 15 15 12 2 164 81 23
1998 63 7 1 27 9 4 55 55 13 15 13 2 160 84 20
1999 60 7 1 27 10 4 53 53 11 15 13 2 155 83 18
2000 59 9 1 27 13 6 53 53 10 15 13 2 154 88 19
2001 53 10 1 27 14 5 50 50 7 14 12 1 144 86 14
Total 433 54 11 194 63 31 380 378 88 104 86 13 1,111 581 143
Baden-
Wuerttemberg Total
Lower
Saxony
Schleswig
Holstein
Payout
Hesse
Payout Payout Payout Payout
 
 
A more detailed analysis reveals that the payout opportunities by law strongly 
depend on the particular federal state. According to Table 2, only about respectively 
12 and 32 percent of all savings banks were allowed to distribute profits in Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Hesse, whereas in Lower Saxony or Schleswig Holstein nearly 
every savings bank was allowed to distribute in the time period from 1995 to 2001. 
More rigorous legal limitations in Hesse and particularly Baden-Wuerttemberg are 
partly responsible for that, though the law in Baden-Wuerttemberg was even more 
rigorous before 1995, when hardly any savings bank was allowed to distribute profits. 
However, the different number of savings banks being allowed to distribute profits is 
also due to different capital endowments. If the legal requirements of Baden-
Wuerttemberg were applied to savings banks in Lower Saxony, about thirty as 
contrasted to more than fifty were allowed to distribute profits. 
Table 2 indicates, that on average about every fourth savings bank that is allowed to 
distribute profits has done so. Irrespective of the particular federal state law, there 
seems to be a trend that savings banks become more and more reluctant to distribute 
profits. Interestingly, this result corresponds to the findings of other papers focusing 
on non-financial firms (see e.g. Fama and French (2001) or Baker and Wurgler 
(2002)), although a supposed linkage with the stock market as found by these studies 
is implausible in case of savings banks. The number of savings banks distributing 
profits decreased from 25 in 1995 to 14 in 2001 due to a decreasing number of 
distributing savings banks especially in Lower Saxony. The Table also suggests that 
the number of distributing savings banks varied marginally over time, i.e. savings 
banks generally maintained their payout decision at least over several years. This 
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result is in line with Gugler (2003), who found that state-controlled firms engage in 
dividend smoothing, while family-controlled firms do not. 
In general, savings banks are reluctant to payout profits. They might argue that they 
have to accumulate their profits in order to build up the financial basis for their 
business. As capital regulation demands a certain minimum ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets, banks otherwise may be forced to cut back their business growth. 
That would not be in the interest of the local authorities either. But there are some 
differences in the savings banks’ reluctance. While in Schleswig-Holstein only 15 
percent of all potentially paying savings banks in fact distribute profits, the fraction is 
somewhat higher in Baden-Wuerttemberg (20 percent) and Lower Saxony (23 
percent), and particularly high in Hesse (49 percent).  
 
Table 3: Medians of variables of local authorities potentially receiving payouts 
 
Local Debts Net income Personnel exp.
Federal state authority (€ per inhabitant) (€ per inhabitant) (€ per inhabitant)
Baden- Towns 972.73 118.40 638.38
Wuerttemberg (n=29)
Districts 692.39 61.65 68.85
(n=33)
Hesse Towns 1,184.98 101.32 531.99
(n=40)
Districts 1,079.64 -1.13 117.64
(n=54)
Lower Towns 886.82 -5.81 462.73
Saxony (n=191)
Districts 1,018.30 4.12 151.69
(n=271)
Schleswig Towns 667.58 111.94 398.75
Holstein (n=41)
Districts 736.78 30.50 119.43
(n=52)  
 
According to our argumentation, the particularly small reluctance to distribute 
profits in Hesse might be the consequence of a particularly bad financial situation of 
local authorities in Hesse. In fact, Table 3 shows that particularly Hessian local 
authorities are highly indebted and would be in need of cash infusions, while local 
authorities in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein are the least indebted.9 
Therefore, we obtain first evidence in favour of our argumentation. 
 
Payout ratio 
Since we want to measure the impact of potential determinants on the savings banks’ 
distribution of profits, we have to define a payout ratio as dependent variable. We 
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9  See e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank (2002) for an overview of the financial situation of German 
 local authorities. 
constructed a variable that measures the savings bank’s freedom of choice regarding 
the determination of the payout level. The payout ratio is defined as the actual level of 
profits distributed divided by the maximum level that could be distributed by law. 
Consequently, it equals zero, if the saving bank does not distribute anyhow, but would 
be allowed to, and equals one, if the savings bank totally exhausts its legal possibilities 
and pays as much money as allowed to the local authorities.  
Alternatively, we measured the payout behaviour more conventionally by dividing the 
actual level of payout by total assets and the net income, respectively. 
4 Methodology and variables 
Since most savings banks do not distribute profits to the local authorities according to 
Table 2, we would not omit much information if we ignored the exact non-zero payout 
level. Therefore, we first of all apply Logit models to explain the savings banks’ 
payout decision. In the Logit model, the dependent variable equals one if profits are 
distributed in the relevant year and zero otherwise. Technically, we model an 
unobservable latent random variable  that linearly depends on the vector of 
explanatory variables 
*
ity
itx , i.e. 
 * '
it it it
y x β ε= +  (1) 
where β  is a vector of coefficients, and it  is a independently and normally 
distributed error term with mean 0 and variance . The observed value , i.e. the 
savings bank’s payout decision, is censored below 0, i.e. 
ε
2
εσ ity
  (2) 
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Besides the Logit model, we follow Kim and Maddala (1992) and apply Tobit 
models, which can take account of the difference between zero and continuous 
observations. Like Logit models they utilise the binary information, whether savings 
banks distribute profits or not. In addition, however, Tobit models explicitly make use 
of the information, whether the level of payouts by the small number of distributing 
savings banks is influenced by the explanatory variables. Therefore, the Tobit model is 
expected to be more appropriate than the Logit model here. In case of the Tobit model, 
the observed value  is modelled as follows: ity
  (3) 
' '
0 '
it it it it
it
it it
x if x
y
if x
β ε β ε
β ε
+ +⎧
= ⎨
+ ≤⎩
where the dependent variable it  refers to the payout ratio with respect to the 
individual savings bank, 
y
itx  is a vector of explanatory variables, β  is a vector of 
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coefficients, and it  is a independently and normally distributed error term with mean 
0 and variance .
ε
2
εσ
10
In order to examine, whether also the financial situation of the local authorities 
influences the savings banks’ decision to distribute profits, the vector itx  of 
explanatory variables does not only contain internal factors of the savings banks, 
which control for the savings banks’ financial situation, but external factors as well 
describing the financial situation of the local authorities. 
ROA, CAP, RISK, CAP_RISK, LA-LOANS and SIZE represent the internal factors. 
ROA is the return on assets defined as the net income of the individual savings bank 
divided by its total assets. It is a proxy representing the banks’ current profitability and 
should be positively related to the payout ratio according to Proposition 1. CAP is the 
banks’ capital ratio defined as the book value of the bank’s reserves divided by total 
assets. It represents the capitalisation of the savings bank and should positively 
influence the payout decision (see Proposition 2). The variable RISK is a proxy for the 
savings banks’ portfolio risk and is defined as the sum of shares and other non-fixed-
income securities, equity participations and loans to customers, where loans to local 
authorities are weighted with zero percent and loans backed by mortgages with 50 
percent. The loans to customers are the most important factor determining the savings 
banks’ portfolio risk. CAP_RISK brings together both CAP and RISK and is defined as 
the savings banks capital divided by its portfolio risk. LA-LOANS refers to the loans 
granted to the local authorities. It is defined as the sum of the savings banks’ loans to 
the related authority divided by total assets and should measure the strength of the 
relationship between both institutions. SIZE, finally, is the logarithm of total assets and 
should control for size effects. Larger savings banks for example might be financially 
more flexible and could rather distribute profits than smaller banks. Barclay et al. 
(1995) found for instance a strong effect of size on the payout decision of US 
corporations. Finally, the type of savings bank might have an influence on the savings 
banks’ payout decision. Potentially, savings banks related to a district might be less 
influenced by the local authority and therefore might be less reluctant to distribute 
profits. To control for these different types of savings banks, we add the dummy 
variables TOWN and DISTRICT to the model. All these internal variables are regarded 
as exogenous. The potential backward effect of the payout decision on profitability, 
the capital ratio and size was considered as negligible. 
In contrast to the internal factors, the external factors refer to the financial situation 
of the local authority. Net income (INC), is defined as the balance of the total income 
and total expenses of the budget (Verwaltungshaushalt) per inhabitant of the town 
and/or district. According to Proposition 3, we expected that the higher the (positive) 
balance, the less the local authority is forced to look for some alternative financial 
sources and therefore is less likely to push through payouts. Since the net income is 
highly volatile, local authorities might pursuit to smooth it by transfers from the 
related savings bank. This expectation would also be in line with the tax-smoothing 
                                                 
 
9
10  The latter assumption of normally distributed residuals might be critical. However, 
 conditional moment tests  could not refuse the assumption and thus confirm the suitability 
 of the Tobit model in many cases. 
hypothesis by Barro (1979). The second factor, personnel expenses (PEXP) is defined 
as a single constituent of total expenses, the sum of personnel expenses, which is 
divided by the number of inhabitants of the town and/or district.11 We assume, that the 
higher the ratio, the smaller is the financial scope of the local authority and the higher 
the pressure to obtain other funding sources. Third, we examine the indebtedness 
(DEBTS) as a determinant of the savings banks’ payout behaviour. Indebtedness is 
defined as the ratio of total debts of the local authority divided by the number of 
inhabitants of the town and/or district. We expect that particularly savings banks 
related to highly indebted local authorities distribute profits. 
Both internal and external factors which potentially determine the savings banks’ 
payout decision refer to the end-of-December of each year. These figures are supposed 
to form the basis for the payout decision by the Verwaltungsrat. Usually the 
Verwaltungsrat decides in spring or summer of the following year, when these internal 
and external figures already have become public. 
 
Table 4: Median of variables for distributing and non-distributing savings banks 
 
Pay- CAP_ LA-
Year out ROA CAP RISK RISK SIZE LOANS INC DEBTS PEXP
1995 No 0.0033 0.0406 0.5441 0.0751 20.6065 0.0371 28.8810 982.83 259.30
Yes 0.0039 ** 0.0419 0.5504 0.0739 20.7800 0.0407 30.2517 1,192.30 *** 302.42
1996 No 0.0031 0.0409 0.5537 0.0736 20.6441 0.0344 18.5708 1,001.28 246.60
Yes 0.0036 *** 0.0441 0.5445 0.0774 20.8866 ** 0.0366 8.9094 1,230.14 * 288.97
1997 No 0.0031 0.0415 0.5648 0.0734 20.7249 0.0354 1.6492 976.39 234.56
Yes 0.0035 *** 0.0431 0.5596 0.0763 20.8716 0.0321 -2.9812 1,077.54 241.87
1998 No 0.0029 0.0422 0.5849 0.0719 20.8288 0.0357 10.9203 928.31 194.68
Yes 0.0034 * 0.0429 0.5563 ** 0.0770 20.9764 0.0280 15.3912 1,117.95 * 259.42
1999 No 0.0028 0.0432 0.5954 0.0734 20.8670 0.0255 20.1693 915.36 231.64
Yes 0.0031 0.0441 0.5546 ** 0.0787 * 21.2036 0.0246 7.8024 1,085.80 306.38
2000 No 0.0027 0.0453 0.6114 0.0743 20.9993 0.0271 27.0088 897.32 217.92
Yes 0.0030 ** 0.0452 0.5816 ** 0.0792 21.3402 * 0.0271 2.5815 1,145.11 ** 291.54
2001 No 0.0018 0.0452 0.6059 0.0737 21.1304 0.0256 19.2772 881.42 230.25
Yes 0.0023 0.0482 * 0.5693 0.0845 ** 21.6429 ** 0.0377 55.9995 1,134.86 * 332.65
Total No 0.0028 0.0421 0.5799 0.0739 20.8443 0.0298 20.0588 933.60 231.61
Yes 0.0033 *** 0.0443 ** 0.5577 *** 0.0772 *** 21.1134 *** 0.0332 12.2669 1,130.29 *** 284.74 **
Relevant local authoritiesSavings banks
 
Note: Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests were carried out to examine, whether the 
medians differ significantly. *, **, and *** indicate significance on the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % 
level, respectively. 
 
Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics regarding the various internal and 
external factors over time and differentiates between distributing and non-distributing 
savings banks. In line with Proposition 1 we find that distributing savings banks in fact 
are more profitable than non-distributing savings banks. Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests, non-parametric alternatives to the two-sample t-test, indicate that ROA, but 
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11  We alternatively defined PEXP as the sum of personnel expenses divided by the total 
 income of the local authorities. However, the conclusions remain the same. 
also SIZE are generally higher for distributing savings banks. With regard to external 
factors results further suggest that distributing savings banks are related to local 
authorities, which are indebted to a stronger extent. Therefore, we obtain first 
evidence, that the financial situation of the local authority as well has some effect on 
the savings banks’ decision to distribute profits (see Proposition 3). 
5 Results 
Table 5 shows the results of the Logit model. We both state the coefficients and the 
marginal effects for each explanatory variable. The coefficients indicate the effects of 
the explanatory variables on the latent variable , whereas the marginal effects, 
calculated for mean values of the explanatory variables, indicate the effect on the 
observable variable i . In other words, the marginal effect represents the change in the 
probability of y=1 due to a unit change in the relevant explanatory variable. 
*
iy
y
Model specification 1 comprises the whole set of explanatory variables. CAP_RISK, 
however, was consciously omitted due to a high collinearity with both CAP and RISK. 
Model specification 2 in turn focuses on CAP_RISK and disregards both CAP and 
RISK. Finally, specification 3 only comprises internal factors, whereas specification 4 
only comprises external factors. 
We find that both internal and external factors influence the savings banks’ payout 
decision. As the LR-test indicates, even exclusively external variables do have 
significant explanatory power with regard to the dependent variable. Among the 
internal determinants profitability, portfolio risk and size are most important. They 
also remain highly significant when modifying the specification according to model 2 
and 3. The striking large coefficient of ROA is particularly due to the small level of 
ROA compared to other explanatory variables. The positive sign of the profitability 
measure indicates that savings banks being more profitable actually are less reluctant 
to distribute profits and confirms our Proposition 1. Therefore, we obtain evidence that 
highly profitable savings banks are less reliant on retained earnings to boost business 
growth. In fact, several savings banks distribute a certain percentage of their net profit 
for the year. However, the savings banks’ capital endowment is of less importance for 
the payout decision. The capital ratio remains insignificant in the model specifications. 
This finding holds for both the ratio of capital to total assets and for the ratio of capital 
to risk-weighted assets. However, we find that portfolio risk has a significant impact 
on the savings banks’ payout decision. According to Proposition 2 we find that savings 
banks with a higher portfolio risk are more reluctant to distribute profits than other 
banks. Furthermore, we find that size is another important variable explaining the 
payout decision. The positive relationship indicates that particularly larger savings 
banks distribute profits. The reason for that finding might be the fact that these banks 
are financially more flexible. Alternatively, they might be stronger exposed to the 
public and therefore could feel more responsible for public affairs and thus for the 
local authorities. The loans to local authorities do have a significant impact on the 
payout decision as well. We find a negative effect, which suggests that loans to the 
local authorities might be a substitute for distributed profits. Such a substitutive 
relationship might hold, since loans to the local authorities usually are priced very 
favourably for the local authorities. Finally, we find only little evidence that the 
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dummy variables TOWN and DISTRICT can explain the savings banks’ payout 
decision.  
 
Table 5: Logit results 
 
Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff.
ROA 778.4664 *** 122.7358 709.3981 *** 114.9538 664.1472 *** 110.0211
(4.83) (4.87) (5.04)
CAP 3.0512 4.8106 2.6390 0.4372
(1.17) (1.01)
RISK -8.3052 *** -1.3094 -5.2811 *** -0.8749
(-4.50) (-4.08)
CAP_RISK 4.3676 0.7078
(0.80)
SIZE 0.6173 *** 0.0973 0.6256 *** 0.1014 0.8425 *** 0.1396
(4.07) (4.35) (5.84)
LA-LOANS -0.3040 ** -0.0479 -0.2107 * -0.0349
(-2.34) (-1.65)
TOWN -0.7775 * -0.1226 0.3144 0.0521
(-1.86) (1.04)
DISTRICT 0.7894 * 0.1245 -0.1577 -0.0261
(1.92) (-0.57)
INC -1.5073 * -0.2376 -0.5519 * -0.0978
(-1.72) (-1.75)
PEXP 5.2198 *** 0.8230 2.0120 *** 0.3260 1.1339 ** 0.2008
(3.56) (3.24) (2.02)
DEBTS 0.9366 *** 0.1477 1.0197 *** 0.1652 1.1903 *** 0.2108
(2.58) (3.24) (3.94)
Constant -14.8086 *** -18.4685 *** -18.0703 *** -2.4609 ***
(-4.33) (-5.64) (-5.82) (-5.75)
Observations 581 581 581 581
Pseudo R2 0.198 0.150 0.138 0.064
Log-Likelihood -260.18 -275.55 -279.42 -303.44
P-val.(LR test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LOGIT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance on the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. z-
values on the basis of robust standard errors are in parentheses. Time dummies are included 
but not reported. Indicated are both the total number of observations and those observations 
being uncensored (non-zero profit distributions). The log-likelihood ratio tests whether the 
log-likelihood in the unrestricted model (with explanatory variables) differs significantly in 
the restricted (with constant only) model. The log-likelihood is the relevant test value. 
 
Besides these internal factors, external factors do influence the savings banks’ 
payout decision as well.12 First of all, we find that the indebtedness of the local 
authorities helps to explain the payouts. The significant and positive relationship 
between the local authorities’ debts and the savings banks’ payout signals that profits 
are preferably paid to highly indebted local authorities. These findings confirm our 
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12  The external factors are divided by 1.000 in order to increase the coefficients in the 
 regression so that they reach a presentable size. The interpretation of the results is not 
 influenced by this procedure.  
Proposition 3. We also find evidence that the financial scope of the local authorities, 
measured by the personnel expenses per inhabitant, has strong explanatory power. We 
obtain evidence that the higher the personnel expenses per inhabitant, i.e. the smaller is 
the financial scope, the more likely is the related savings bank to distribute profits.  
In contrast, the local authorities’ net income seems to be of less importance for the 
savings banks’ payout decision. However, we find some evidence of a negative 
relationship between net income and the payout ratio. Since payouts from the savings 
banks are higher, when net income is lower, we obtain some evidence that local 
authorities try to smooth their net income. 
 
Table 6: Tobit results 
 
Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff
ROA 237.5197 *** 53.0392 239.7837 *** 53.2626 237.4377 *** 54.3101
(5.94) (5.71) (5.48)
CAP 0.8856 0.1977 0.8647 0.1978
(0.54) (0.46)
RISK -2.2528 *** -0.5031 -1.8547 *** -0.4242
(-5.22) (-4.04)
CAP_RISK 2.1953 *** 0.4876
(2.45)
SIZE 0.2085 *** 0.0466 0.2637 *** 0.0586 0.3597 *** 0.0823
(3.95) (4.86) (6.60)
LA-LOANS -0.1354 -0.0302 -0.1212 -0.0277
(-0.85) (-0.67)
TOWN -0.3431 ** -0.0668 0.1103 0.0264
(-2.26) (0.98)
DISTRICT 0.1921 0.0434 -0.1159 -0.0264
(1.56) (-1.17)
INC -0.1314 -0.0293 -0.1342 -0.0327
(-1.35) (-1.19)
PEXP 1.8496 *** 0.4130 0.8638 *** 0.1919 0.6366 *** 0.1550
(3.68) (3.92) (2.73)
DEBTS 0.3276 *** 0.0731 0.4034 *** 0.0896 0.5515 *** 0.1343
(2.91) (3.75) (4.95)
Constant -5.2281 *** -7.5842 -7.7257 *** -1.7671 -1.1619 ***
(-4.57) (-6.44) (-6.27) (-6.52)
Obsservations 581 581 581 581
Uncensored 143 143 143 143
Pseudo R2 0.1916 0.1551 0.1333 0.0708
Log-Likelihood -296.88 -310.27 -318.27 -341.23
P-val.(LR test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
TOBIT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance on the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. z-
values on the basis of robust standard errors are in parentheses. Time dummies are included 
but not reported. Indicated are both the total number of observations and those observations 
being uncensored (non-zero profit distributions). The log-likelihood ratio tests whether the 
log-likelihood in the unrestricted model (with explanatory variables) differs significantly in 
the restricted (with constant only) model. The log-likelihood is the relevant test value. 
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Table 6 presents the results for the Tobit model. In contrast to the Logit model, the 
marginal effects here do measure the effect of the explanatory variables on the 
expected value of the dependent variable conditional on the dependent variable being 
observed, i.e. not censored. Although the coefficients differ from these of the Logit 
model to some extent, the results are very similar. The findings from the Tobit model 
suggest, that not only the binary payout decision, but also the non-zero payout level is 
influenced by the explanatory variables in the expected manner. Profitability, portfolio 
risk and size are relevant internal factors explaining the level of payouts. Interestingly, 
the capital-to-asset ratio is insignificant, whereas the risk-weighted capital ratio is 
significant. This result suggests that regulatory capital requirements influence the 
payout decision. In contrast to the results from the Logit regression, however, we do 
not find a significant and negative (substitutive) relationship between the loans granted 
to the local authorities and the level of payouts. Furthermore, our finding is confirmed 
that also external factors affect the distribution of profits. More specifically, we find a 
positive and significant effect of both the local authorities’ indebtedness and their 
personnel expenses per inhabitant on the payout level. Thus, also the Tobit model 
provides support for Propositions 1 and 3. However, we obtained mixed evidence in 
favour of Proposition 2. On the one hand, portfolio risk has a significant and negative 
impact on the payout decision as expected, on the other hand results suggest so far, 
that the capital ratio does not influence the payout level. Again, these results remain 
robust when modifying the specification by omitting variables according to 
specifications (2) to (4). 
 
Further robustness checks 
As a first robustness check we examine each year of the observation period separately 
in order to detect potential divergent relationships over time. Table 7 shows the results 
from the Tobit model for the individual years 1995 to 2001. The results confirm our 
previous findings that the internal factors profitability, portfolio risk and size, but also 
the external factor describing the indebtedness of the local authority help to explain the 
payout decision of the savings banks. Beyond, we find that these results are quite 
robust over time. We detect a significant relationship between these explanatory 
variables and the payout level for almost every single year. However, the explanatory 
power of the model tends to become smaller in the end of the observation period. In 
2001, the LR-test indicates that all explanatory variables do not have a significant 
effect on the payout decision. We ascribe this finding to the low number of savings 
banks distributing profits in 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Tobit results for each individual year 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
ROA 185.2204 ** 243.0252 ** 436.5280 *** 374.3887 ** 91.8919 322.4766 * 163.4855
CAP 2.9288 4.2721 6.1445 17.4820 28.1925 3.2649 0.1082
RISK -2.2032 -3.1033 ** -1.9752 -0.9703 -4.8258 *** -4.0618 ** -2.1998
SIZE 0.2273 ** 0.2769 ** 0.3744 ** 0.2658 0.4810 *** 0.2963 0.2967 *
LA-LOANS 1.7141 0.1047 -2.6090 0.9160 3.5750 -0.1853 6.0296
TOWN 0.1212 -0.0120 -0.1346 0.0752 0.2106 0.2487 0.0020
DISTRICT -0.2727 -0.1803 -0.3897 -0.0061 0.1078 0.2548 -0.2629
INC 1.0171 0.7152 -1.0533 0.3963 -0.6200 -0.1417 -0.1190
DEBTS 0.6597 *** 0.5268 ** 0.4285 0.6570 ** 0.4428 0.7655 ** 0.6497
Constant -5.3186 ** -5.8452 ** -8.9186 *** -8.1340 * -10.0681 ** -6.4089 -6.9345 **
Observations 80 79 81 84 83 88 86
Uncensored 25 24 23 20 18 19 14
Pseudo R2 0.2574 0.2499 0.2059 0.1828 0.2188 0.2403 0.1468
Log-Likelihood -40.94 -41.07 -44.29 -41.92 -37.41 -40.93 -37.35
P-val.(LR test) 0.0008 0.0012 0.0063 0.0273 0.0128 0.0021 0.1696  
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance on the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. z-
values on the basis of robust standard errors are in parentheses. Indicated are both the total 
number of observations and those observations being uncensored (non-zero profit 
distributions). The log-likelihood ratio tests whether the log-likelihood in the unrestricted 
model (with explanatory variables) differs significantly in the restricted (with constant only) 
model. The log-likelihood is the relevant test value. 
 
Next, we examine in more detail, whether the payout behaviour differs among the 
different federal states. We focused on a comparison between Lower Saxony and the 
three other federal states in the sample, since the number of observations for the latter 
three federal states were too small for being analysed separately. Table 8 summarises 
the results. Whereas our previous findings regarding profitability, portfolio risk and 
size hold for both groups of savings banks, we find that even the capital-to-asset ratio 
has a positive and significant effect on the distribution of profits in Hesse, Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein. In contrast to our findings from the Logit-
Model for the whole sample, we find that loans to local authorities do have a positive 
and significant effect on payouts in Lower Saxony. The results suggest that the closer 
the relationship between the savings bank and the local authority, the higher is the 
level of payouts. As the dummy variables TOWN and DISTRICT are concerned, our 
earlier finding that rather savings banks related to districts than savings banks related 
to towns do distribute profits is confirmed. However, the relationship only holds for 
Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Schleswig-Holstein.  
We also find some interesting differences regarding the relevance of the external 
determinants of the savings banks’ payout decision. While the indebtedness of the 
local authorities is significant and positive for the sample comprising Hesse, Baden-
Wuerttemberg, and Schleswig Holstein, we find a significant and positive effect of the 
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personnel expenses per inhabitant on the payout decision in Lower Saxony.13 
However, the interpretation of the results is similar. In both groups of savings banks 
the financial situation of the local authorities helps to explain the savings banks’ 
payout decision as assumed in Proposition 3.  
 
Table 8: Tobit results for different federal states  
 
Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff.
ROA 215.5739 *** 44.8733 181.8097 ** 22.0531
(5.40) (2.17)
CAP -0.4028 -0.0838 41.6097 *** 5.0471
(-0.18) (2.72)
RISK -1.1642 *** -0.2423 -6.7323 *** -0.8166
(-2.81) (-5.64)
SIZE 0.1708 *** 0.0355 0.2596 ** 0.0315
(2.85) (2.29)
LA-LOANS 2.4268 ** 0.5052 -0.6897 -0.0837
(1.97) (-0.26)
TOWN -0.1809 -0.0339 -0.2488 -0.0269
(-1.17) (-0.73)
DISTRICT 0.0944 0.0197 0.8358 *** 0.1268
(0.76) (2.85)
INC -0.2821 -0.0587 -0.0742 -0.0090
(-1.02) (-0.73)
PEXP 1.2061 ** 0.2511 1.4521 0.1761
(2.24) (1.46)
DEBTS -0.0257 -0.0053 1.6561 *** 0.2009
(-0.22) (5.44)
Constant -4.2885 *** -6.9079 ***
(-3.31) (-2.67)
Observations 378 203
Uncensored 88 55
Pseudo R2 0.1630 0.4150
Log-Likelihood -165.70 -90.26
P-val.(LR test) 0.0000 0.0000
TOBIT
Lower Saxony Schleswig-Holstein
Baden-Wuerttemberg,
Hesse,
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance on the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. z-
values on the basis of robust standard errors are in parentheses. Time dummies are included 
but not reported. Indicated are both the total number of observations and those observations 
being uncensored (non-zero profit distributions). The log-likelihood ratio tests whether the 
log-likelihood in the unrestricted model (with explanatory variables) differs significantly in 
the restricted (with constant only) model. The log-likelihood is the relevant test value. 
 
                                                 
13  The variables PEXP and DEBTS are multicollinear to some extent. If DEBTS is excluded 
 from the regression, PEXP becomes significant for savings banks in Hesse, Baden-
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Furthermore, we analyse potential differences between the different types of 
savings banks. Savings banks related to an alliance of both towns and districts for 
instance might be influenced by the local authorities less easily than savings banks 
related to a single district or town, since the influence of the single town and district is 
smaller. In order to accomplish their aims the relevant local authorities had to arrange 
coalitions of interests first, which are difficult to constitute.  
Table 9 summarises the results. Not surprisingly, we find that profitability is very 
relevant for the payout decision of all groups of savings banks. Savings banks related 
to towns or districts do particularly consider portfolio risk when determining the level 
of payout, whereas savings banks related to both towns and districts rather take 
account of the capital-to-asset ratio. The interpretation of the results, however, is 
similar. They suggest that savings banks with a higher regulatory capital ratio tend to 
be less reluctant to distribute profits. However, size significantly affects the payout 
decision only in case of savings banks related to districts and savings banks related to 
both towns and districts. Larger savings banks in the observed four federal states, 
which are related to a town, therefore, are not more likely to distribute profits than 
smaller savings banks. Savings banks related to a town differ even in another respect. 
Loans to the local authorities are irrelevant for their payout decision, whereas they 
have a significant and positive effect on the level of payouts for other savings banks. 
As the external factors are concerned, we find some evidence for our assumption 
that the external factors are less relevant for savings banks related to an alliance of 
both towns and districts. Whereas the indebtedness of the local authorities is highly 
significant for the payout decision of savings banks related to districts and the 
personnel expenses per inhabitant are strongly relevant for savings banks related to a 
town,14 we find no evidence that these variables are important determinants for savings 
banks related to both towns and districts as well. We only find some meagre evidence 
that the local authorities’ net income might have some influence on the savings banks’ 
payout decision. This finding supports our assumption that the local authorities try to 
influence the savings banks payout decision if they can. In contrast to model 
specification 1 the savings banks are assigned to the local authorities in a different way 
according to model specification 2. Instead of calculating the arithmetic mean of the 
financial data of the relevant towns and districts, the data of the savings banks related 
to both towns and districts were exclusively assigned to the financial data of the single 
local authority, whose financial situation is comparatively worst. However, the 
different models show robust results. 
 
 
 
Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein. However, DEBTS even remains insignificant for 
savings banks in Lower Saxony if PEXP is excluded from the regression.  
  Table 9: Tobit results for the different types of savings banks 
 
Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff.
ROA 184.9383 *** 31.6795 302.0700 *** 59.5656 226.8138 *** 18.3074 234.3285 *** 19.2051
(2.80) (3.73) (3.07) (3.23)
CAP -3.3460 -5.7317 8.5292 1.6819 112.9629 *** 9.1178 111.2886 *** 9.1210
(-0.35) (0.60) (5.22) (5.06)
RISK -6.0475 *** -1.0359 -1.8258 *** -0.3600 2.1798 0.1759 1.9334 0.1585
(-5.66) (-3.38) (1.29) (1.18)
SIZE 0.3000 ** 0.0514 0.0117 0.0023 0.5147 ** 0.0415 0.5658 ** 0.0464
(2.21) (0.14) (2.34) (2.42)
LA-LOANS 3.3812 * 0.5792 -0.1492 -0.0294 10.3635 ** 0.8365 10.4137 ** 0.8535
(1.88) (-0.62) (2.23) (2.16)
INC -0.5802 -0.0994 -0.4323 -0.0852 -0.1395 * -0.0113 -0.0702 * -0.0058
(-0.66) (-1.23) (-1.70) (-1.66)
PEXP 2.1185 0.3629 3.5411 *** 0.6983 0.5327 0.0430 -0.2897 -0.0237
(1.51) (4.32) (0.29) (-0.35)
DEBTS 0.7409 *** 0.1269 0.2897 0.0571 0.0113 0.0009 0.1004 0.0082
(4.19) (1.36) (0.06) (0.60)
Constant -5.0682 -2.9454 * -18.4622 *** -19.1757 ***
(-1.51) (-1.77) (-3.24) (-3.22)
Observations 280 171 130 130
Uncensored 62 45 36 36
Pseudo R2 0.2301 0.3388 0.4948 0.4974
Log-Likelihood -121.77 -76.04 -46.26 -46.02
P-val.(LR test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(2)
Savings banks related to both
towns and districts
related to districts related to towns (1)
TOBIT
Savings banks Savings banks
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance on the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. z-
values on the basis of robust standard errors are in parentheses. Time dummies are included 
but not reported. Indicated are both the total number of observations and those observations 
being uncensored (non-zero profit distributions). The log-likelihood ratio tests whether the 
log-likelihood in the unrestricted model (with explanatory variables) differs significantly in 
the restricted model (with constant only). The log-likelihood is the relevant test value. 
 
Finally, we also utilised alternative definitions of the dependent variable as a 
robustness check. In order to circumvent biased coefficients, we continued to focus on 
these savings banks, which are allowed to distribute profits by law. Table 10 presents 
the results. On the one hand, we defined the dependent variable as the level of payout 
divided by the net income of the savings banks, and ignored the maximum payout 
level determined by law. Consequently, this ratio measures, which share of the total 
profits are actually distributed. However, since the maximum payout level usually 
refers to the savings banks net income, the results are expected to be similar to these 
obtained earlier. Indeed, we obtained very similar results like before. On the other 
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14  If PEXP is excluded from the regression, we find that DEBTS is significant and positive in 
 case of savings banks related to towns as well. 
hand, we defined the payout ratio as the payout level divided by total assets. Again, the 
conclusions from the findings are very similar to those obtained before.15  
 
 
Table 10: Alternative dependent variables 
 
Coef. Marg. eff Coef. Marg. eff
ROA 39.2314 *** 8.6904 159.4668 *** 33.8711
(6.35) (7.86)
CAP 0.1685 0.0373 0.6002 0.1275
(0.70) (0.77)
RISK -0.3683 *** -0.0816 -1.2482 *** -0.2651
(-5.54) (-5.74)
SIZE 0.0325 *** 0.0072 0.1076 *** 0.0229
(3.98) (4.02)
LA-Loans -0.0188 -0.0042 -0.0579 -0.0123
(-0.85) (-0.82)
TOWN -0.0614 *** -0.0116 -0.0002 *** 0.0000
(-2.62) (-3.18)
DISTRICT 0.1813 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000
(0.96) (0.54)
INC -0.0232 -0.0051 -0.0706 -0.0150
(-1.54) (-1.45)
PEXP 0.2756 *** 0.0611 0.9254 *** 0.1966
(3.55) (3.64)
DEBTS 0.0504 *** 0.0112 0.1697 *** 0.0360
(2.90) (2.99)
Constant -0.8063 *** -0.0027 ***
(-4.57) (-4.64)
Observations 581 581
Uncensored 143 143
Pseudo R2 0.7145 -0.1174
Log-Likelihood -28.8964 794.96
P.-val.(LR test) 0.0000 0.0000
TOBIT
Payout/Profit Payout/Total assets
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance on the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. z-
values on the basis of robust standard errors are in parentheses. Time dummies are included 
but not reported. Indicated are both the total number of observations and those observations 
being uncensored (non-zero profit distributions). The log-likelihood ratio tests whether the 
log-likelihood in the unrestricted model (with explanatory variables) differs significantly in 
the restricted (with constant only) model. The log-likelihood is the relevant test value. 
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15  Since the dependent variable is much smaller by construction, the coefficients of the 
 explanatory variables would be much smaller as well. In order to obtain presentable 
 coefficients, we decided to divide all explanatory variables by 1.000. The only effect is 
 that the coefficients of the explanatory variables become larger by the factor 1.000. 
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6 Conclusions 
We analyse the payout decision of German savings banks. Due to their special 
institutional characteristics, savings banks heavily rely on retained earnings in order to 
fund their business growth. Therefore, they are expected to be reluctant to distribute 
profits to the local authorities which represent the savings banks’ responsible bodies. 
However, German savings banks have a public mandate, which could call for 
distributing profits to the local authorities.  
According to the laws by the federal states, the savings banks are free to distribute 
profits, but have to observe a maximum amount, which they are not allowed to excess. 
Within these limits, German savings banks are expected to determine their payout 
level depending on their financial situation. Indeed, our results confirm that 
profitability has a positive and portfolio risk a negative effect on the savings banks’ 
payout decision. Furthermore, results suggest that larger savings banks are less 
reluctant to distribute profits.  
Given that the beneficiaries of the payouts, the towns and districts, are seriously 
indebted, it could be argued, that the relevant local authorities might lobby for payouts 
being as high as possible. Lobbying might be possible, since a board finally decides on 
the payout decision, which is dominated by persons elected by the local authorities. 
Therefore, the financial situation of the local authority may play a certain role in the 
determination of the payout level.   
Indeed, we find evidence that the distribution of profits is not only influenced by 
internal factors related to the individual savings bank, but also by external factors 
related to the local authorities. Results suggest that the worse the financial situation of 
the related local authority, the more likely is the savings bank to distribute profits and 
to increase payouts, respectively. More specifically, we find that both the indebtedness 
per inhabitant and the personnel expenses per inhabitant do have a significant and 
positive impact on the savings banks’ payout decision. Furthermore, we find some 
meagre evidence that local authorities try to smooth their net income with the help of 
the payouts from the savings banks. Interestingly, the local authorities’ indebtedness 
and personnel expenses do not play a significant role in case of savings banks being 
related to an alliance of both towns and districts. These savings banks are expected to 
be less influenced by the towns and districts, since the dependence on a single local 
authority is lower. 
In total, the results rather suggest that there is a significant influence of the local 
authorities on the payout decision of German savings banks, although savings banks 
could voluntarily determine their payout level according to the financial situation of 
the relevant local authority. However, since the overall payout level of the savings 
banks to their local authorities is quite low by size and only a few savings banks 
actually distribute profits, the extent of exerting an influence is either limited or little 
successful. At any rate, there seems to be no menace for the savings banks’ funding.  
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